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George P. Fletcher's Romantics at War begins by describing an ironic
blindness. The threat of terrorism has forced Americans to consider
questions of war and guilt with a new sense of immediacy and relevance, to
disorienting effect. We remain unable to reconcile our instinctive view of
the war on terror as a moral conflict, pitting good against evil, with our
basic legal and moral commitments, rooted in notions of fairness and
individual justice. Professor Fletcher proposes to clarify this "conceptual
morass" (p. 5) by drawing our attention to what may be an irreducible
contradiction between our liberal aspirations and our Romantic impulses.
The first step in Fletcher's argument is to reveal what he perceives as
the shortcomings of a liberal tradition embraced by most American legal
theorists. According to Fletcher, liberalism cannot fully explain the nature
of our legal duties in the context of war, much less account for the feelings
of solidarity that shape a nation's willingness or unwillingness to engage in
war. What we need in order to think more clearly about these issues is an
altogether different vantage point. Fletcher finds this alternative footing in
Romanticism, from which he develops a concept of the nation as a
collective agent and as a potential bearer of guilt.
Fletcher is by no means the first to criticize liberalism for its
preoccupation with the individual and its tendency toward a universalism
based on abstract principles of reason.1 More unique is his intent to focus
on the tension between liberalism and Romanticism without necessarily
arguing for one over the other. In order to defend the Romantic perspective
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1. See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 4-5 (1993) (describing the
common basis of critique among adherents to an "antiliberal tradition"),
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against its own potential excesses, however, Fletcher adopts too narrow a
view of the Romantic movement to make the tension productive. He is,
paradoxically, forced to resort to liberal principles in order to vindicate a
mode of thinking he characterizes as diametrically opposed to liberalism.
The aim of this Comment is to extend and modify Fletcher's account of
the conflict between liberals and Romantics by examining an aspect of the
Romantic tradition that he ignores. Specifically, it highlights a particular
conception of imagination central to the English Romantics' understanding
of national identity. At the same time, it argues that Fletcher's approach to
the question of war's appeal and his argument for the principle of collective
guilt are inconsistent with his own premises.
I
At a philosophical level, "the Romantic break with the Enlightenment
was meant to be radical and irreconcilable" (p. 26).2 Fletcher describes this
break by contrasting the Romantics' commitment to a world of sensual
impulse and inner feeling with a more detached, Kantian belief in
transcendent reason as the path to truth (pp. 17-21). Privileging the
subjective and partial over the objective and universal has a methodological
significance as well: Only by entering the Romantic mindset, he argues, is it
possible to understand phenomena that to liberals appear simply irrational,
such as the concept of national honor or the necessary violence of war.3
One central part of Romantic thinking in Fletcher's analysis is a
commitment to the ideas of nationhood and national identity. Whereas
liberals define the nation according to its political and legal institutions,
Romantics see the nation itself as an organic actor in history. While nations
cannot partake of the essential human dignity that liberalism attributes to
rational beings, they can, Fletcher asserts, "experience glory and grandeur
as well as humiliation" (p. 21). In the Romantic conception, moreover, the
identity of individuals is bound up tightly with that of their nations. The
Romantic views national identification not in terms of the rights and duties
of citizenship, but rather as a mode of self-expression.4
2. Fletcher draws his description of Romanticism largely from Isaiah Berlin's account of the
movement. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM (Henry Hardy ed., 1999). Berlin
notes the difficulty of defining Romanticism as such, in light of both the quantity and variety of
later commentary on the movement as well as internal differences among major figures of the
period, which he identifies as spanning roughly 1760-1830 and extending across England, France,
and Germany. See id. at 1-20. Fletcher himself discusses William Wordsworth, Johann Gottlieb
Fichte, and Georg Hamann as representing Romanticism in different ways (pp. 17-19).
3. For example, Romantic sensibilities account for the acceptability of war, beyond any
question of necessity or legal justification, when "[t]he values of brotherhood, courage, and honor
overwhelm the prior sense that shooting at other human beings is irrational and barbaric" (p. 12).
4. Daniel Farber has remarked upon a similar position Fletcher advanced regarding the idea
of American nationhood following the Civil War: "Rather than being based on the voluntary
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The internal cohesion of self and nation serves as the basis for
Fletcher's argument that nations themselves can be meaningfully
characterized as bearers of guilt. Sometimes-most notably during war-
the nation not only demands certain actions of its citizens but also acts
through individuals in a way that expresses their collective intentions.
These actions manifest a unique form of agency, distinct from the agency of
individuals (pp. 72-74, 82-83). If a nation can experience honor on the basis
of its actions, it can also, he claims, bear guilt on that basis.
To grasp fully Fletcher's theory of collective guilt, it is important to
recognize that he does not propose a new form of criminal liability, nor
does he suggest that nations themselves be put on trial. Rather, the primary
effect of collective guilt would be to mitigate the guilt of individuals.
Fletcher's paradigm case is the trial of a war criminal like Slobodan
Milosevic or Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann was rightly found guilty of the
most serious offenses against international law, but, Fletcher insists, he was
not guilty alone. Rather, he acted from within a national community whose
norms permitted or even rewarded his crimes, and he could not have carried
out such crimes without that community's collective intention to
accomplish them (pp. 94-95, 166-67). As a result, a tribunal might have
recognized the degree to which his own guilt was shared by the nation as a
whole, and might even have spared him the death penalty (p. 163).
As Peter Berkowitz has observed, this does not imply "that Fletcher has
a scintilla of sympathy for the likes of Milosevic" or Eichmann. 5 We might
well ask, however, what sorts of sympathies do motivate Fletcher's
argument, since the appeal of mitigating punishment for perpetrators of
genocide or crimes against humanity is hardly obvious. The book suggests
at least two alternative answers. The first would claim that in order to
identify accurately the scope of agency in judging criminal behavior, it is
necessary to consider the extent to which a defendant's acts may
simultaneously reflect the intentions of a broader collective. This line of
argument, on which doing justice to the individual demands an assessment
of collective guilt, initially departs from liberal individualism, but
ultimately vindicates liberal notions of culpability by purporting to hold
individuals to account for their own actions and no one else's.
6
association of a social compact. nationhood involves a kind of organic solidarity based on the
'bonds of memory.' Nationalism [for Fletcher] is not merely a concept but a 'romantic surge."'
Daniel A. Farber, "Nor Long Remember," 18 CONST. COMMENT. 423, 428 (2001) (reviewing
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2001)) (citation omitted),
5. Peter Berkowitz, Byron at Ground Zero, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 2002, at 31, 35
(reviewing Fletcher's Romantics at War).
6. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 462 (1978) (distinguishing
culpability from wrongdoing to argue that "the maximum level of punishment is set by the degree
of wrongdoing," while "punishment is mitigated.., as the actor's culpability is reduced"). This
point becomes especially significant in the context of accessory liability, where German criminal
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The second apparent motivation is somewhat less developed, yet
arguably even more important to Fletcher's overall project. By applying
collective guilt to crimes committed in the name of the nation itself, a
society characterizes such crimes in a manner that has important
implications for their victims. Recognizing collective guilt, Fletcher argues,
is a means of producing an institutional memory or archive of the crime
that, in turn, can pave the way toward reconciliation (p. 209). If a nation
commits genocide, for example-a crime that Fletcher argues cannot, by
definition, be undertaken by individuals acting alone 7-punishing the
individual killers is not sufficient, since it risks dispensing with all
responsibility for, even all memory of, the dominant culture's role in the
killing. In contrast, acknowledging collective guilt in addition to the guilt of
individuals memorializes the crime and calls attention to the rift it has
produced within society, thereby providing for the possibility of
reintegration. In this respect, "collective guilt... fulfills an important social
function" (p. 203). The mitigation of individual guilt can be seen as
instrumental in achieving this broader social aim.
II
If the purpose of collective guilt is primarily to serve a social function,
then it becomes necessary to examine how the principle is not only
informed by, but itself informs, a certain notion of collectivity. In posing
the question of collective guilt, Fletcher urges us to consider the presence of
a "nonrational" element in our system of laws (p. ix). This consideration is
crucial to the understanding of war's appeal, and also lets us see the conflict
between liberal claims to the universality of reason and the reality of
linguistic difference and cultural specificity. Fletcher's model of
Romanticism is, however, too reductive, insofar as it relies on a simple
opposition between rationality and nonreason. This opposition conditions
his treatment of the concept of nationhood and obscures the complexity of
the connection that binds individuals to a particular nation.
While an individual's attachment to the nation is not impelled by
strictly rational motives, Fletcher elides any further explanation of exactly
how that bond is formed. An "easy transition in Romantic thinking from the
individual self to the nation" (p. 36) seems to tie together Fletcher's
law, for example, recognizes a principle of categorical mitigation that is not officially recognized
in the Anglo-American system. See id. at 636.
7. Fletchcr describes both genocide and hate crimes as "expression[s] of collective conflict"
(p. 68) and argues that, under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, genocide-
along with war crimes, aggression, and crimes against humanity-is punishable only insofar as it
reflects the hostility of one group of people toward another group. The Court would hold
individuals accountable for such crimes, but, Fletcher contends, "the formal structure of liability
should not camouflage the collective personality inherent in the crime" (p. 70).
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reflections on the impulse to wage war for national honor with his
development of the notion of collective guilt. A key feature of the
"individual self' in Fletcher's portrayal of Romanticism is what he refers to
as its expansiveness (pp. 22-24). The expansionist self encounters the
nation not as a limit on its individuality but as a way of transcending its
own situation and achieving solidarity with others. In fact, however, it is
possible to locate a rather different account of the construction of national
identity within Romanticism itself. The unique Romantic insight centers on
the imagination, which, as it figures in the movement, stands for more than
just the activity of an individual mind. For at least one important branch of
Romanticism, the imagination served not just as a means of aesthetic self-
expression, but as an instrument of ethical relations and social change.
For Romantic poets like Wordsworth and Coleridge, cultivating the
imagination did not mean a withdrawal of the individual into the inner
world of personal feelings, much less a simple projection of such feelings
onto the outside world.8 Rather, these writers viewed their artistic project as
a reaction to "the great national events... daily taking place" in England at
the inception of the Industrial Revolution, 9 and ultimately aimed to reorient
the ethical sensibilities of their readers to bring them into contact with
others whose experiences did not resemble their own. 10 If these thinkers
believed in the possibility of the nation as a unified, organic community,
that nation would, ironically, have to be constructed against the
fragmentation of the polity that industrialization and urbanization were
bringing about. Hence the task they assigned to the imagination can also be
understood in terms of its ideological function, where ideology signifies
"the necessity for a society to 'forg[e] a representation of its unity.""'l This
necessity arises precisely because a unifying conception of the nation does
not present itself unmediated.
8. Compare Fletcher: "For [Romantic] poets, musicians, theologians... [t]he world outside
is understood as a reflection of the world within" (p. 18).
9. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads (1800),
reprinted in SELECTED POEMS AND PREFACES 445, 449 (Jack Stillinger ed., 1965).
10. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Moral Dilemma, in WHAT HAPPENS TO HISTORY:
THE RENEWAL OF ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 215, 229-30 (Howard Marchitello ed.,
2000). Spivak reads the English Romantics "as wanting to say... that the imagination, which is
our inbuilt capacity to other ourselves, can lead perhaps to understanding other people from the
inside." Id. at 229. Martha Nussbaum echoes this language in speaking of the role of imagination
in the thought process of an ideal "literary" judge. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy,
22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 110-11 (1993). Spivak, however, has distinguished her own
"Wordsworthian model" of the imagination from Nussbaum's idea of it as "a sympathetic
identification, a bringing of the other into the self"--a view that Spivak identifies, moreover, as
characteristic of "liberal academics." Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Righting Wrongs, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMAN WRONGS (Nicholas Owens ed., forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 32 n.14,
on file with author), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/lawculture/Spivak%20Paper.pdf.
11. FOREST PYLE, THE IDEOLOGY OF IMAGINATION: SUBJECT AND SOCIETY IN THE
DISCOURSE OF ROMANTICISM 3 (1995) (quoting JOHN B. THOMPSON, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY 25 (1984)) (alteration in original).
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Fletcher's portrayal leaves out the role of ideology in establishing a
national identity but does not present an adequate alternative account.
Rather, Fletcher assumes his own conclusion by starting from the notion
that "[t]he one truth for the Romantic is the coherence of the self' (p. 148),
and proceeding to describe the nation as just a collective manifestation of
the internally unified self One result of this approach would be the
Romantic spirit's finding natural solidarity with fellow citizens. But it
would also seem to imply that those outside one's own national community
must be viewed as irreducibly different-either a threatening enemy to be
resisted, or an "exotic" curiosity to be admired (p. 43). By conceiving of
national identity as a merely natural or organic formation, the differences
between nations are easy to assimilate either to a crude and dangerous
opposition between friend and enemy, or to an empty, and possibly just as
dangerous, cultural relativism.
More recent interpretations of the Romantic movement have called this
organic presupposition into question. Specifically, it has been argued that
the Romantics developed a "theory of the imagination... that... does not
presume the unity of either subject or nation," but rather "takes the
divisions of both as the starting point of its ideological work."' 12 In this
view, "[c]oherence is not.., a condition of the process but an imaginary
outcome."'1 3 Thus, the Romantic imagination provides the basis for
constructing a unity that would not otherwise exist. The nation can be
represented or imagined as singular, but its boundaries remain porous and
subject to reconfiguration.
Ill
Having emphasized the ideological dimension of the bond between self
and nation, it is useful to reconsider the analytical function of the contrast
Fletcher draws between liberals and Romantics. While this contrast may
shed light on collective guilt by highlighting aspects of national identity
that a traditional liberal account excludes, it cannot supply an independent
basis for making a normative assessment of those questions. Romantic
sentiment, in other words, might give us a vocabulary for describing the
principle of collective guilt but is insufficient to justify incorporating such a
principle into our system of laws. Nonetheless, at important points in his
argument, Fletcher equivocates as to whether Romantic sensibilities serve
as an explanatory tool or as an implicit justification.
As suggested in Part I, the idea of collective guilt as a mitigating
principle in criminal justice appears to have two possible motivations-one
12. Id. at 57.
13. Id.
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related to doing justice for individual defendants, the other to serving a
broader purpose of social cohesion. The first argument is based on a
principle of distributing guilt, which Fletcher reaches by analogy to the
notion of comparative negligence in tort law. Much as liability can be
distributed among several tortfeasors to the degree to which they are each
responsible for an accident, he urges us to imagine a similar system for
distributing guilt in criminal cases (p. 158). The crucial difference is that
comparative negligence is based on relative causation, whereas the theory
of collective guilt, Fletcher insists, must be noncausal but "expressive" (p.
164).14 In other words, collective guilt only applies to actions that express
the intentions of the collective itself, which has created the conditions of
possibility for the crime to occur and gives it a particular social meaning.
This formulation may limit the application of collective guilt, but it
fails to explain why it should serve as a mitigating factor for the guilt of the
individual. Indeed, Fletcher appears to work backward from mitigation in
order to derive an understanding of the nation's collective unity (p. 165). In
a way, this reinforcement of the idea of the nation as a unified whole
through the principle of collective guilt is just the point. The recognition of
collective guilt becomes troubling, however, insofar as it obscures the
ideological construction of the individual's attachment to the nation and
limits the possibility for its reform. Such attachment must be viewed as
itself excusable, if not simply natural; otherwise, it would be impossible for
collective guilt to function effectively as a basis for mitigation.
Having made this connection explicit, one should at least question
whether it is desirable for the ideological dimension of national identity to
play such a significant role in criminal trials under domestic or international
tribunals. To an extent, Fletcher's second argument in favor of collective
guilt addresses this consideration. Acknowledging collective guilt, he
argues, is a way of inscribing certain crimes in the cultural memory of a
nation so as to provide the opportunity for reconciliation between the
dominant society and its victims. But the expressive ambivalence of a
model of national belonging that relies on an organic link between
individuals and the nation would seem to weaken this account as well.
A nation's dominant ideology can be judged blameworthy after the fact
for crimes it has sanctioned, but in relation to the individual who acts
contemporaneously with it, collective guilt would have it function only as
an excuse. Under a theory of Romanticism in which the guilt of a nation is
14. Fletcher's insistence that the relationship between an individual's acts and the collective
action of the nation is not causal likewise leads him to reject an analogy to the criminal law idca
of complicity (pp. 163-64). Even if the individual and the nation could be characterized as co-
perpetrators of a collective crime, the element of "hegemony" or control over the act that would
be necessary to lower the individual's status to that of accessory (and thereby justify mitigation) is
missing from the offenses that Fletcher considers (pp. 163-64). See also FLETCHER, supra note 6,
at 654-57 (discussing the rationale for categorical mitigation of an accessory's punishment).
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just the flip side of its glory, and in which an organic bond between self and
society underwrites both, the very possibility of collective guilt would seem
to undermine the responsibility of individuals in the present. Fletcher
recognizes this aspect of his account as a potential "excess" of
Romanticism. Yet, ironically, his only response is to reaffirm the principles
of liberalism: "In the end, the Romantic quest for honor and glory-for the
realization of the self in national assertion-brings us back to the
universality of the human condition.... Our capacity for feeling guilt
underscores our humanity more than its [sic] affirms our allegiance to a
particular nation" (p. 212). This answer is unsatisfying in the context of
Fletcher's broader argument, since there is no legal or even moral
imperative that would seem to constrain nations as such from acting in
pursuit of glory at the expense of individual human beings. Even if we
accept that nations exercise collective agency, there is no reason to assume
that such agency would be responsive to the same sorts of humanistic
sympathies that Fletcher affirms on the part of individuals. International
law, of course, may function as a constraint on individual decisionmakers in
their official capacities, but where the risk of abuse is greatest, collective
guilt would lead to mitigation.
IV
The most significant insight of Romantics at War is Professor
Fletcher's revelation of the tension between liberalism and a set of impulses
and commitments that belongs to an altogether different, and mostly
unacknowledged, tradition. Romanticism, moreover, provides a critical
template for identifying aspects of national identity that liberalism simply
excludes. Fletcher's argument, however, reduces the differences between
Romantics and liberals to a simple opposition, and relies too extensively on
an uncritical conception of nationhood. As a result, the normative
significance of collective guilt and the impulse to wage war for national
honor are rendered equivocal. This Comment suggests that a different
understanding of Romanticism may provide a basis to critique the
ideological underpinnings of national identity without ignoring the
importance of such identity to Fletcher's questions of war and guilt. At the
same time, Romantic imagination suggests a way of understanding
collectivity that neither reproduces the universalism of liberals nor
reinforces the exclusionary boundaries of an organic conception of the
nation. In the context of a war that itself is not restricted to conflict between
individual nations, this perspective might inform an evolving conception of
the boundaries of national community and call attention to how ideological
constructions can shape and be shaped by a system of criminal liability.
-William B. Michael
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